Associate Professor,Graduate School of Law, Hokkaido University*Profile is at the time of the award.
2020Inamori Research GrantsHumanities & Sociology
I am very grateful for the grant for this research. I would like to provide a new perspective on the urgent issues of modern society without being bound by existing values.
In this research, I have considered from the perspective of legal philosophy whether and to what extent we can construct normative theories of discrimination based on the respect as an individual.
I have clarified the theoretical content of two theories and compared their respective strengths and weaknesses: (1) the deliberative-freedom view, which bases the moral wrongness of discrimination upon the infringement of individual freedom not to be forced to consider his or her characteristics (e.g., race or gender); and (2) the respect view, which bases the moral wrongness of discrimination upon the infringement of human dignity. To be more specific, I have examined whether and how they can cope with the instances of direct or structural discrimination and those against members of (putative) non-historically disadvantaged groups.
As a result, it has been concluded that while the deliberative-freedom view has the advantage of being able to explain the common feature of both direct and indirect discrimination in a unified way, referring to the fact that both types of acts make the exercise of individual freedom difficult in the same manner, we can argue from the respect view that the wrongness of indirect discrimination should be explained by the considerations independent from the wrongness of discrimination per se. It has also been concluded that both views can to some extent properly explain the wrongness of discrimination against members of (putative) non-historically disadvantaged groups, e.g., whites, men, or different age groups.
Humanities & Sociology